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This research is about investigating a new attack idea on anonymous communication 
systems, in particular Tor network. Tor is an open source anonymity network that helps 
users defends against a form of network surveillance that threatens personal privacy, 
confidential business activities and relationships. Tor is currently the state-of-the-art in 
low-latency anonymity systems and is the largest deployed anonymity network ever.   
Since its first deployment in the late 2003, several vulnerabilities have been discovered 
and several attacks have been reported. At the same time, the design of Tor went 
through several modifications and improvements driven by the discovered 
vulnerabilities and the reported attacks. This research moves in the same direction as it 
investigates a relevant attack idea that would constitute a major threat to Tor clients. The 
attack aims to push the client to use specific exit policies (unpopular ports) for its traffic. 
This way, the path selection algorithm of Tor is manipulated to select among a small 
number of Tor relays from which the attacker controls an important fraction. The attack 
is successful if both the entry and exit nodes selected by the client happen to be 
compromised.   
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 محمد علي سليمان الاسم:
  فذ. امنالمن خلال إعادة توجيه  عدم الكشف عن الھويه أنظمة مھاجمة العنوان:
  حاسب الآليعلوم ال: تخصصال
 .ھجري 3341جمادى الآخرة،  :تاريخ التخرج
شبكة تور.  بالخصوص على ،عدم الكشف عن الھويه أنظمة ل التحقيق في فكرة ھجوم جديد علىحويدور  ھذا البحث
تھدد الخصوصية الشخصية  راقبة شبكة الاتصالمن مضد نموذج  لمستخدمينتحمي امصدر التور ھي شبكة مفتوحة 
أكبر شبكة  ھو و عدم الكشف عن الھويه من أحدث نظم ھو وأنشطة الأعمال التجارية السرية والعلاقات. تور حاليا
تم ، 3002في أواخر عام  مرة لأولنشرھا  ه الشبكة والإعلان الأول عن ھذ أي وقت مضى.   منذ متوفرة في
اكتشاف العديد من الثغرات الأمنية وأفيد عن وقوع عدة ھجمات. في الوقت نفسه، ذھب تصميم تور من خلال العديد 
 من التعديلات والتحسينات مدفوعا بالثغرات الأمنية المكتشفة والھجمات التي تم الإبلاغ عنھا. ھذا البحث يتحرك في
 مدخل ھجوم يھدف لدفع العميل لاستخدامال شكل تھديدا كبيرا لعملاء تور.ي الاتجاه نفسه كما أنه يحقق في فكرة ھجوم
  .ببرنامج اختيار المسار ليقع الإختيار على ملقم تحت سيطرة المھاجم الطريقة ، يتم التلاعبلا يحظى بشعبية و بھذه 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As people are massively depending on Internet in the recent years for their day to day 
activities, privacy is undoubtedly a critical issue. Opinion poll keeps reminding us that 
one of the most important reservations most users of the Internet have, is the fear of 
having their privacy been infringed. Unfortunately, that isn’t unjustifiable as corrupt 
marketers, private and government security agencies have been aggressive in monitoring 
and censoring user’s activity on the Internet.  
Today there are some compliant network services and useful data encryption algorithms 
to protect network traffic. However it is still hard to hide routing information such as 
source and destination addresses, packet length, etc. For this reason attackers can make 
use of such parameters to obtain some valuable information about users. 
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Anonymity System is an information security term that refers to a measure taken to 
protect user privacy over a network in which the identity of a sender (information source) 
and a recipient (information destination) is concealed from public including a legal 
network monitoring agency. More precisely, it is the state of being not identifiable within 
a set of subjects (that is anonymity set) [1]. At present various technologies of anonymity 
have been employed in various fields of human endeavor such as e-voting, e-commerce, 
e-banking, e-auction and many more.   
Tor is undoubtedly the most popular low latency TCP based anonymity protocol that 
supports wide range of Internet applications such as web browsing (http), file transfer 
protocol (ftp), instant messaging (chat), file sharing and email clients. This research work 
focuses on Tor Networks.  
 
1.1. MOTIVATION 
Tor is the most widely used anonymity network all over the world. It has enabled 
approximately 36 million people around the world to experience fundamental freedom of 
access and expression on the Internet while protecting their privacy and anonymity [15].  
Tor is an open source Protocol which makes it possible for researchers to mount several 
attacks on the protocol and exposing vulnerabilities with the intention of revealing 
possible flaws and provide mitigation or suggest solutions. This has led to several update 
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of Tor software. In the same spirit we studied Tor Protocol intensively, present a new 
attack scenario and provide mitigation.  
 
1.2. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Tor is an onion routing anonymity system originally developed for the U.S. Navy 
primarily to protect government communications. However, this purpose has 
dramatically changed after it has been donated to the Open source community. Tor is 
reported to have clients in more than 126 different countries with Germany, China, and 
United States as the major users of Tor [2]. 
Tor is used by people with varieties of purposes. Normal people use Tor to protect their 
privacy as well as that of their children from being stolen by corrupt marketers and 
identity thieves. Military use Tor to hide their location, protect military interests and 
operations, as well as protecting themselves from physical harm when deployed in the 
field. Journalists use Tor to investigate state propaganda and opposing viewpoints, to file 
uncensored stories and avoid the risk of being arrested. Activists use Tor to anonymously 
report abuses from danger zones of the world. Bloggers use Tor to avoid being sued or 
fired for saying completely legal things online. Law enforcement officers use Tor for 
carrying undetected surveillance on questionable web sites and much more [3] 
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Tor protocol utilizes the power of the two main anonymity approaches. Mixing and 
proxy, it uses public key cryptography to establish circuit and use symmetric key 
cryptography to move data like SSL-TLS based proxies, this makes it possible to fool 
Bob in believing that a request is coming from a routing relay and not Alice. In addition, 
the protocol distributes trust among the intermediary relays just like mix system, a 
condition that makes it difficult at least for any malicious relay node to know that the 
transmitting payload is channeling to Bob or the data is coming from Alice. Tor protocol 
system has four recognizable features:  
I. Perfect forward anonymity, incrementally building circuit through session key 
negotiation with each next node and regular renewal of circuit. 
II. Several TCP streams are multiplexed in a circuit, which helps in reducing latency. 
III. Leak pipe circuit topology, Tor initiator is responsible for directing traffic to 
nodes pathway down the circuit, meaning that the traffic can exit the circuit at the 
middle thereby prevent end-to-end attack.   
IV. Transaction between nodes is TLS based, which makes it difficult to modify the 
transmitting data and as well depict a relay. 
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1.2.1. Tor Unpopular Ports 
Tor is mainly designed to support Internet applications which typically require high 
responsiveness and because of the fact that certain applications have tendency to leak 
some fragments of relay information or making Tor relays vulnerable to spams and 
viruses, Tor default exit policy rejects relay requests for some applications (ports) 
through Tor Networks as shown in table1.1, thus they are termed as unpopular ports.  
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Port 
25 
119 
135-139 
445 
563 
1214 
4661-4666 
6346-6420 
6699 
6881-6999 
TABLE 1.1: List of Tor unpopular ports which are rejected by the default 
Tor exit policy 
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1.3. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Typical attacks on Tor anonymity network aim to reveal the identities of clients (senders) 
and/or servers (destinations). However, Tor tries to hide the connection between clients 
and servers by forwarding the traffic through a circuit composed of typically three nodes. 
A successful attack involves identifying the first node in the circuit (entry-node) and the 
last one (exit-node). In a very simple attack, a malicious party may inject several Tor 
relays in the network and then waits until a client selects two of these compromised 
relays as entry and exit nodes. This will reveal both the client and the server identities. 
Since the path selection algorithm used by Tor is bandwidth-weighted (high bandwidth 
relays tend to be selected with high probability), an improved version of the attack would 
be to inject malicious Tor relays with high bandwidth so that to maximize their chances 
of being selected by the client. Empirical analysis by Murdoch and Watson [6] confirmed 
the efficiency of this attack. 
More precisely, Murdoch and Watson investigated the relationship between the path 
selection algorithm and path compromise with respect to the attack’s cost for the 
adversary. They identified the fraction of malicious Tor routers and the fraction of 
adversary-controlled bandwidth as important factors for predicting the adversary’s ability 
to compromise paths.   
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In this research work we investigated a new attack scenario similar to attack in [6], 
however instead of relying on bandwidth of the injected relays, we play on the exit 
policies of the injected relays. 
 
1.4. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The main contribution of this thesis is as follows: 
• We present detailed technical study of Tor protocol. 
• A study of the weaknesses of the path selection algorithm. 
• Investigation of a new attack on Tor based on the ports used by TCP based 
applications. 
• Present experimental analysis showing the impact of the proposed attack on the 
anonymity of Tor.   
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1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology followed in this research can be summarized in the following 
phases: 
 
1.5.1. Phase 1: Understanding Tor 
The project starts by a thorough study of the Tor protocol/network. The study focuses on: 
• The literature papers: we carry out intensive survey on both old and most recent 
research papers on anonymity in general, and later narrow down to Tor protocol.  
• The design documents: all Tor design documents are available from the Tor 
Project website including the TLC RFC specifications, etc. we study essentially, 
Tor main design specifications and path selection specification. 
• The source code: Since Tor is open source software the source code is available, 
we modified the code to obtain some statistical information, recompiled and 
implemented. 
• The local deployment of the network: the Tor network can be locally deployed 
which will constitute a valuable source of concrete information about the 
functioning of the protocol.     
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1.5.2. Phase 2: Attack Design, Implementation and Deployment 
Our attack methodology consists of combining three techniques: 
 
• Technique 1: Path selection manipulation 
Focus on the manipulation of Tor path selection algorithm to make it selects the 
malicious Tor relays with more probability. This is a known and well-proven technique to 
attack Tor network. It is well established that if the path selection algorithm is 
successfully manipulated, the attacker has a significantly better probability to control one, 
two, or the three nodes of the Tor circuit. 
 
• Technique 2: Port redirection 
In network communication, every application type (http, ftp, telnet, etc.) has a port 
number associated to it and standardized by the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority). However, port redirection is a known trick that allows bypassing firewalls by 
tunneling traffic through another port number. In this attack, our approach is to push the 
client to use some unpopular port numbers. 
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• Technique 3: Injecting Malicious Relays 
Injecting relays is a very popular technique to compromise circuit nodes. It has been used 
in most of reported attacks on Tor. In the context of this research, we use this technique 
because it does not require large networking resources. It only requires a certain number 
of relay information that we can moderately satisfy.       
 
1.5.3. Phase 3: Experimental Methodology 
In this attack we assume that the attacker is in control of a web server and has the ability 
to inject a certain number of Tor relays with the desired bandwidth and exit policy. 
Hence, the experimental setting is composed of a compromised web server and a certain 
number of compromised Tor relays. Then, we simulate a client that will repeatedly open 
circuits in the Tor network. The experiment consists in measuring the fraction of the 
circuits being broken by the attacker (i.e. the entry and exit nodes of the circuit happen to 
be injected by the attacker). We will observe the trend of this fraction as we play on: 
• number of injected relays 
• bandwidth of the injected relays 
• exit policies of the injected relays 
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1.5.4. Phase 4: Attack Mitigation 
This phase focuses on proposing mitigation to prevent this attack or at least make it very 
difficult to execute. More precisely for every exploited weakness that made the attack 
possible, suggest countermeasures. 
  
1.6. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents different anonymity 
Systems. Chapter 3 presents related work on Tor networks. Chapter 4 presents our 
proposed attacks based on unpopular ports, as well as details on simulation of Path 
Selection Algorithm. The implementation and experimental analysis are discussed in 
chapter 5. Finally, attack mitigation and conclusion are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ANONYMITY SYSTEMS 
 
This chapter is a survey of various anonymity protocols. We attempt to provide 
classification of anonymity systems and we present the state-of-the-art anonymity 
services or free software.   
 
2.1.     DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS NETWORK (DC-NET) 
The Anonymity idea was first proposed by David Chaum in the journal of cryptology 
1988 where he illustrated the non-routing based anonymity communication systems “The 
Dining Cryptographers problem - unconditional sender and recipient unlinkability [7, 8]. 
Figure 2.1 below illustrates the DC-Net.  
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1: Illustration of dining cryptographers’ Network (Dc-Net). A 
paid but its identity remains anonymous to B and C 
1 
1 0 
B C
A
1 xor 0 = 1 
1 
1 
0 
B C 
A 
non(1 xor 0 )= 0 
1 xor 0 = 1 
Part I: None of them 
paid 
1 xor 0 xor 1 = 0 
Part II: A paid 
0 xor 0 xor 1 = 1 
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The above illustration involves three cryptographers who are served food in a restaurant 
and were expected to settle the bill anonymously in a way that if one among the three 
pays the bill anonymously the remaining two cannot link the payment to the payer. 
However, another party not among them (says NSA) may pay the bill and in that case no 
anonymity is involved. So the problem is to find who actually paid the bill among the 
cryptographers through the use of two stage protocol. In the first stage a secret key is 
shared pairwise among the three cryptographers say by a toss of a coin on condition that 
they all follow the ethics of not revealing to each other the secret shared by each other 
pair. In the second stage of the protocol each of them privately XOR the two secrets 
shared with others and announce the result of XORing only if one is not the payer of the 
meal or announces the opposite of the result of XORing, if and only if one paid the bill. 
The third stage of the protocol involves finding out who paid the bill for the meal. If the 
result of XORing the three announce results by the three cryptographers is zero, then the 
third party not among the three cryptographers (says NSA) paid the bill and in that case 
no anonymity is needed, otherwise one of them is the payer but it turns out to be not 
linkable to any participants. In the above illustration, in the second part ‘A’ is the payer, 
but ‘B’ cannot link the payment to ‘A’  because, ‘B’ doesn’t know the secret between ‘A’ 
and ‘C’. Likewise ‘C’ can neither link the payment to ‘A’ because, ‘C’ doesn’t know the 
secret between ‘A’ and ‘B’.  However, the protocol is extendable to n group of 
participants in a ring topology. 
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Wright et al in [16] presented a generic attack based on probabilistic approach on group 
of anonymity protocol models DC-Net inclusive and concluded that it lacked scalability, 
it is vulnerable to Denial of Service attack and required extremely low cost to attack the 
ring-based version of DC-net.      
 
2.2.    MIX SYSTEM ANONYMITY PROTOCOL 
Prior to DC-Net mix system anonymity protocol was introduced by Chaum. This was in 
the late 1981 when RSA public key encryption was relatively new [7]. The main idea is 
that messages to be anonymous are relayed through one or more nodes called mix which 
originally uses RSA public key encryption. Messages are divided into blocks and 
encrypted using RSA. Conceptually the first few blocks are the header of the message 
and contain the address of the next mix node. More precisely, a mix first generates a 
public and private key pair and makes the public component known to clients who wish 
to relay messages through the mix. We let C = Ex (M) denote encryption of a message M 
with mix x’s public key and also let M = Dx (C), denote decryption of a ciphertext C with 
mix x’s corresponding private key. 
 The concept of mix was invented to prevent traffic analysis associated with mailing 
system. Mix system receives several mails from different client mailing servers and other 
mix nodes it then permutes the collected mails and sends out to mail server or another 
17 
 
 
 
mix in such a way that the sources and the intended destinations cannot be linked. 
Through the use of mix system between the mailing servers (say two mix system shown 
in figure 2.2), Alice prepares and encrypts the message to be sent to Bob, using Bob 
public key KB appends with the Bob address, thereafter she double encrypts the resulting 
message with the public keys of the two mix systems as follow: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 2.2: Mix Networks for two mixes  
MA 
Alice  
SmA 
rMA 
S2 …
r1 
r2 Bob 
MB 
S2 
SmB 
r2 
rMB 
S1 
…
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KMA (RMA (KMB(RMB (KB(RB , M) | BAddress) ) | MBAddress)   ⇒    KMB(RMB (KB(RB , M)  | 
BAddress)) ⇒  KB(RB , M)     
Where KMA, KMB and KB are the public keys of the first mix, second mix and Bob 
respectively, and RMA, RMB , and RB are random strings of the first mix, second mix and 
Bob respectively added to prevent vulnerability of attacks
 
 due to identical message under 
the same asymmetric key, these are discarded. And ⇒  represent transformation of the 
message as it passes through the Mix System. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
Alice sends KMA (RMA (KMB(RMB (KB(RB , M) | BAddress) ) | MBAddress)   to the first mix 
node, the node decrypts the incoming messages using its private key, permutes the 
messages and sends KMB(RMB (KB(RB , M) | BAddress))  to the second mix node, on 
reaching the next mix node, it decrypts the message including other messages it receives 
from various sources with its private key, permutes the messages and sends KB(RB , M) to 
bob.   
In [17], Pfitzmann and Pfitzmann shown how an active attack can break the original 
Chaum’s mix networks, their argument was based on the direct use of the RSA for 
signing and encryption, rather than the mix protocol itself, RSA has a well-known attack 
which exploits its mathematical bases; the integer factorization. In 1995 Kocher 
described a new timing attack [18] based on details knowledge of processing power of 
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the machine in which the RSA is implemented, ability to measure the decryption time of 
some known ciphertext then decryption key ‘d’ can easily be deduced. 
Nevertheless, following Chaum’s mix network proposal researchers  have developed 
diverse anonymity systems for different applications examples include Crowd’s for 
anonymous web transaction[9], Freenet for distributed anonymous information storage 
and retrieval [10], Onion Router for anonymous routing [11 and 12], Tarzan for p2p 
networking [13], and VPN for secure shell. While some other researchers work toward 
enhancing mix network for instance, [1] stated that Babel and Mixmaster are 
implemented based on original Chaum’s mix model and both extended the original idea 
of mixing. Batches of messages to provide backward feed of messages in a pool as in the 
case of Mixmaster, while Babel delays some fraction of messages on additional round, 
these together with other methods aimed to prevent (n – 1) attacks, in which an attacker 
sends one message in order to trace an empty mix together with (n -1) recognizable 
messages.  
 
2.3.   CROWDS ANONYMITY PROTOCOL 
Reiter and Rubin in [9] presented a different anonymity system called Crowds for web 
transactions. In Crowds protocol the client request is randomly sent to one of the user 
participating in crowd which in turn randomly forwards it to another user or the intended 
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server on behalf of the originator of the request. Through this protocol, web servers are 
unable to learn the originator of a request because all participants are equally likely to be 
the originator of the request and not even the collaborating member who forwards the 
request on behalf of another. Crowds in [1] was described as landmark in anonymity 
research since its security lies on the inability of an attacker to observe the links, rather 
assumed to control a small fraction of nodes which can be achieved using simple link 
encryption and padding. 
 
2.4.    TARZAN ANONYMITY PROTOCOL 
Tarzan is an onion routing peer-to-peer anonymous IP network overlay [13]. Tarzan 
achieves its anonymity with layered encryption and multi-hop routing, very much like 
Chaum original mix. It uses a network address translator (NAT) to bridge between 
Tarzan hosts and obvious Internet hosts. A peer initiates the transport of a stream through 
the network, creates an encrypted tunnel to another node and requires that the node to 
connect the stream to another peer. By so doing, Tarzan has a restricted network topology 
in which each node maintains persistent connections with a small set of other nodes 
creating a structure called mimics. Paths for anonymous traffic are selected in a way that 
they will go through mimics in order to avoid links with insufficient traffic. [1] Points out 
that the weak spot of mimics scheme is that selection of neighboring nodes is done on the 
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basis of network identifier or address which is easy to spoof in real-world networks. 
Clayton and Denezis reported in [1] that they found an attack against original Tarzan 
strategy which requires each node to know a random subset of other nodes in the 
network.  
Another widely used onion routing anonymous network is Tor.  Tor is a second 
generation onion routing anonymity system designed to support TCP-based applications. 
 
2.5.   TOR PROTOCOL INNER-WORKING 
Tor is the most popular anonymity network known today. It is designed with different 
flavors to provide anonymity to Internet users. It is open source software maintained by 
Tor Project. The network relies on public users to donate their bandwidth as relay. Tor 
relays are mainly three types: (1) entry node-first relay through which a client connects to 
Tor network, (2) middle node-intermediate relay which helps to extend client traffic forth 
and back, and (3) exit-node which submits client request to a remote server. The chosen 
exit node must have exit policy that supports client application port. Other Tor nodes 
include guard node, directory servers, autonomous servers and hidden service relays 
(introductory and rendezvous points).         
In a broader sense, for Alice (the client) to communicate with Bob (the server) 
anonymously over Tor networks as illustrated in figure 2.3(a), Alice’s onion proxy (OP) 
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obtains a list of Tor relays ( nodes) from directory server. From the list, it randomly 
selects pathway through Tor relays to Bob (see figure 2.3(b)). Starting with the selection 
of an exit node by ensuring that its exit policy is met, client proxy establishes session key 
and circuit with the first or entry node, tunneling through this circuit it incrementally 
extends the circuit one node at a time up to the exit node. In each step, it establishes 
session key with the Tor node in its pathway as shown in figure 2.3 (c, d and e).  
Once the circuits are successfully established, Alice can then communicate with Bob 
relaying traffic through Tor nodes anonymously as in figure 2.3 (f). The OP's edge onion 
relay (entry node) in the circuit knows that it is communicating with Alice client and 
knows that it is to relay the incoming payload to the next Tor node in the path, but cannot 
confirm that Alice is the owner of the incoming encrypted data, neither can it say that the 
next node in the path is the final recipient of the data. The same applies to the next onion 
relay up to the exit node who knows that the message is for the Bob but cannot say who 
originated the communication (see illustration in figure 2.4).  
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FIGURE 2.3: (a) Alice wants to communicate with Bob, (b) Alice’s OP 
obtained list of all routers and selected path, (c) OP establishes session key and 
circuit with Entry onion router, (d) OP tunnels through the circuit to establish 
session key and extend the circuit to middle onion router, (e) OP further 
tunnels through the circuit to reach exit onion router, establishing session key 
and extends the circuit, and (f) Alice traffic passes through Tor network to 
Bob.  
(f) 
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Adopted from [5] 
FIGURE 2.4:  Tor’s system architecture and threat model 
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Moreover, to see the in depth description of how Tor works based on the specification 
obtained from [4], it is good to note that the unit of communication in Tor protocol is 
fixed-width "Cell" (see figure 2.5a), Cell packet mainly consists of three components: 
I. The Circuit ID whose values indicate which virtual circuit the cell references to. 
II. The COMMAND whose values are different commands used to communicate 
between client and Tor relays forward and backward. 
III. Lastly, PAYLOAD which is the store for messages/data to be transmitted to 
another node. 
 Additional details of other fields and/or the different values they can accept will be 
cleared to us as we describe further. For the purpose of description again, we assumed 
that Alice (the client) wants to communicate with Bob (the server), and that Alice Onion 
Proxy (OP) has obtained a list of Tor relays from the trusted directory server. Also, 
supposed that Alice client proxy has randomly chosen only three distinctly unique relays, 
namely R_1, R_2, and R_3, where it chooses R_3 first, to serve as its exit OR node and 
R_1 as the entry OR node. The following describes circuit establishment: 
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a) Alice proxy generates CREATE Cell (see figure 2.5b), assigns arbitrarily unique 
2- byte integer value as Circuit ID, assigns 'CREATE' as COMMAND field value, while 
PAYLOAD contains padding and the following; OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric 
Encryption Padding, which is used mainly in RSA to prevent vulnerability of short 
message attacks), Symmetric key K, 1st part of gX, and 2nd part of gX. In this step the 
client proxy divides the expected random number (first half of DH) which is used to 
create master secret in to two parts for security purpose, it uses the public key of R_1 to 
encrypt the 1st part of the random number, and the symmetric key K. Moreover, it uses 
the symmetric key K to encrypt the 2nd part of the random number and forwards the cell 
to R_1. The idea here is that, only R_1 could be able to decrypt the first part of the 
Encrypted message with her private key, and then get access to the shared symmetric 
key K to decrypt the 2nd part of gX. 
So, when the CREATE Cell reaches R_1, it will decrypt the first part of the message with 
its RSA private key and use the revealed shared key K to decrypt the second part of the 
message. Then combines the two part of gX to form the complete random number (i.e. 1st 
half of DH) sent from the client proxy. R_1 then generates its own random number gY 
(2nd half of DH) and combines the two (gXY) to form the pre-master secret (K0). 
Subsequently, it uses the pre-master key to generate master secret (KH) and finally, 
further hashing of K0 creates 100 bytes key material K (i.e. K= (KH| Df| Db| Kf| Kb)) in 
accordance to Tor specification schemes [4]. When this is done, R_1 sends respond to the 
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client by creating CREATED Cell (see figure 5c), containing the same value of Circuit 
ID, CREATED as COMMAND field value, and PAYLOAD contains server's random 
number gY (second part of DH), and derivative key (KH). When Client receives 
CREATED Cell, it uses its random number (gX) together with the returns server's random 
number (gY) to calculate pre-master key and subsequently the master key K. It uses the 
agreed SHA hash algorithm with first 20 bytes of K to form the derivative key (KH) and 
compare with the one received in the CREATED Cell, if they are the same, then the 
Handshake is completed. Session key, plus circuit is established with R_1. 
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Figure 2.5: (a) A typical Tor cell, (b) CREATE Cell and (c) CREATED Cell.  
CELL_LEN = 512 bytes; 2 bytes Circuit ID, 1 byte Command and 509 bytes 
PAYLOAD  
(a) (b) 
(c) 
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(a) (b) (c) 
FIGURE 2.6: (a) A typical Relay Cell, (b) Relay Extend Cell, and (c) 
Relay Extended Cell 
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b) To tunnel through the circuit established with R_1, and extend to R_2, Alice 
client creates a RELAY Cell (see figure 2.6(a)) with RELAY as COMMAND field 
value, and PAYLOAD containing two messages as shown in figure 2.6(b).  
The first message is unencrypted and is to be used by R_1 for further instruction about 
the nature of RELAY command. This unencrypted message contains RELAY EXTEND 
as REL-COMMAND field value, an integer digit greater than 0 (which means R_1 is to 
process the cell and forwards it to another Relay node) as RECOGNIZED field value, 
zero or an arbitrarily chosen ID by OP (assigned to a relay cell of the same circuit and 
used to determine cells belonging to the same data stream) as STREAM ID field value, 
DIGEST field value is 4 bytes of running digest seeded from Df (forward digest) shared 
with R_1, and the number of bytes in relay payload for real payload data as LENGTH 
field value. Address and port refers to ipv4 and port number for the next relay node in 
the path (R_2).  The second message contains a CREATE information - OAEP, 
Symmetric key K, 1st part of gX and 2nd part of gX, similar to the one described in a) 
above. Interestingly 1st part of gX and symmetric key k are encrypted with R_2 RSA 
Public key, while the 2nd part of gX is encrypted with symmetric key k. The entire 
messages in the payload are then encrypt with the forward key (kf) shared with R_1. 
The RELAY Cell is transmit to R_1, on receiving the cell R_1 checks the Circuit ID and 
determines if it has corresponding circuit along that connection (which it has in this 
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case), then decides if RECOGNIZED field is zero (which is not) and ensures that other 
conditions hold. R_1 executes RELAY EXTEND command by creating CREATE Cell, 
generates unique 2 bytes integer Circuit ID not yet used on the connection, and encloses 
the second part of message it received as payload from RELAY Cell into the CREATE 
cell as PAYLOAD and transmits to R_2.  
In returns, R_2 decrypts the first half of DH using its private key and shared key k in a 
similar way described previously, it then creates CREATED cell containing its own 
randomly generated half of DH (2nd half of DH) and computes KH (which is the 20 
bytes derivative key) as Payload data. It then sends this cell backward to R_1 as shown 
in figure 2.6(c). R_1 will then replaces the content of RELAY Cell PAYLOAD with 
RELAY EXTENDED as REL-COMMAND field value, 4 bytes digest seeded from Db 
(backward digest) shared with OP as DIGEST, 0 as value of RECOGNIZED field and 
the payload handshake data from R_2 CREATED cell as well as the new value of 
LENGTH field.  
The PAYLOAD is encrypted using shared Kb (backward key) and the cell transmits back 
to OP. When Client OP receives RELAY EXTENDED cell it decrypts the payload using 
Kb (backward key) it shares with R_1, it then observes the Circuit ID, stream ID to 
ensure that there are matches, observes that the Recognized field is zero and the Digest 
value equals. Thereafter, it uses its half of DH with the received half of DH from R_2 and 
calculates full DH key (pre-master key) using the key to derive K (the master key). Then, 
it compares the generated derivative key KH with the one received in payload, if they are 
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the same, the handshake is completed, session key established and the Circuit is extended 
to R_2. 
 
 
c) To further extend this circuit to R_3 which is the exit node in this case, Alice 
client creates a RELAY Cell similar to b) above. Unlike the above, the PAYLOAD is 
firstly encrypted with the Kf (forward key) shared with R_2 forming the inner onion 
layer, and then with forward key shared with R_1 forming the outer onion layer. The 
relay cell is sent to R_1. On reception of the Relay cell, R_1 decrypts the outer onion 
layer with the forward key shared with OP and observes the content of PAYLOAD, it 
further processes the data in the PAYLOAD if it recognizes it. Otherwise it forwards the 
Cell along the circuit. R_2 receives the RELAY cell, observes the Circuit ID, decrypts 
the inner onion layer, and uses the unencrypted message in the PAYLOAD to process 
the RELAY Cell. It observes the Stream ID and Rel-Command field values. With the 
value of RECOGNIZED field not equal to zero and observes that other condition been 
hold, R_2 creates CREATE Cell with a unique Circuit ID, and encloses the encrypted 
data of RELAY EXTEND cell payload into the CREATE Cell PAYLOAD and sends to 
R_3 after observing the port number and validity of the address. R_3 receives the 
CREATE cell, use its RSA private key to decrypt the first part of the data in the 
PAYLOAD, which is the same with the one described several time above - OAEP, 
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symmetric k shared key, 1st part of g^ X and use the revealed symmetric key to decrypt 
the second part of the data in the PAYLOAD, which is meanly the 2nd part of gX.  
R_3 then creates CREATED Cell contains its own randomly generated half of DH (2nd 
half of DH) and computes KH (which is the 20 bytes derivative key) as Payload data and 
sends backward to R_2. In sequence R_2 retrieves the CREATED Cell Payload, 
encloses in RELAY cell, replaces the command with RELAY EXTENDED encrypts the 
entire payload with backward key (Kb) shared with OP, and sends backward to R_1. 
R_1 further sends backward the RELAY cell once encrypted with its backward key 
shared with OP. On receiving the Relay cell, Alice client decrypts the outer layer with 
the backward key shared with R_1, and decrypts the inner layer with the backward key 
shared with R_2 to reveal the RELAY EXTENDED Cell. It observes the Circuit ID, 
stream ID to ensure that there are matches, observes that the Recognized field is zero 
and the Digest value equals. Thereafter, it uses its half of DH with the received half of 
DH from R_3 and calculates full DH key (pre-master key), using the key to derive K 
(the master key). It then compares the generated derivative KH with the one received in 
payload. If they are the same, the handshake is completed, session key established and 
the Circuit is extended to R_3. And this completes the session keys and circuit 
establishment. What follows is the data exchange via end-to-end TCP connection with 
Bob (the server). 
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2.6.    TAXONOMY OF ANONYMITY SYSTEMS 
Anonymity systems can be divided into different types either based on anonymity objects 
or based on mechanisms of operation. Based on the anonymity object, the anonymity 
systems are divided into three classes namely:  
• Sender anonymity which conceals the relationship between message and its sender 
• Recipient anonymity which conceals the relationship between message and its 
recipient  
• Relationship anonymity which conceals relationship between sender and the 
recipient.  
However based on the mechanism of operation anonymity can be divided into two types:  
• A non-routing-based anonymity communication system like Dining Cryptograph 
technology (DC-Net) which ensures the unlinkability of sender anonymity, 
recipient anonymity and relationship anonymity.  
• The other type is the routing-based anonymity in which data are passed through 
one or more transmitting nodes between the sender and the recipient, while the 
nodes can rewrite, fill and transmit data packets to hide the source of data packets 
and their relationship between input and output. Examples of routing-based 
anonymity are mix system, Onion Routing, Tarzan and Crowd, etc.  
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• Moreover, these routing-based anonymity systems are further divided into high 
latency and low latency systems based on Internet applications they support. 
Common Internet applications such as Web browsing, video teleconferencing, file 
transfer protocol (ftp), remote login (Telnet), emails and broadcast all of which use 
IP (Internet protocol) as the transmission mechanisms. These have different 
performance indices because of their requirement on network bandwidth, 
responsiveness, tolerance to communication noise and implementation techniques.  
Thus, mix systems which are suitable for low responsiveness application such as 
email, are referred to as high latency systems, while Onion routing systems which 
are suitable for high responsiveness applications such as web browsing, chatting, 
ftp, etc. are referred to as low latency system. 
 
2.7.      FREE ANONYMITY SOFTWARE 
While they may not provide 100% anonymity online, these free anonymity software can 
be used in places where there are high need for privacy. Places like Internet café, 
libraries, Airport, schools, workplaces, public and prepaid Wi-Fi hotspot. Pending on 
individual needs they are good for home usage in order to avoid Internet eavesdroppers of 
all kinds. 
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2.7.1. Cross-Platform Solutions 
• JonDo originally known as JAP is a VPN client written in java and routes data 
across the JonDo networks. JAP was originally developed as part of project of the 
Dresden University of Technology, the University of Regensburg and Privacy 
Commissioner of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany [14]. It sends requests through a 
cascade and mixes data streams from different users in order to further conceal 
data to outsiders. Unlike Tor, the mix cascades (set of anonymization proxies) 
used by JAP are known individual organizations and users themselves may 
choose among the operators they will trust. JAP name was changed to JonDo in 
2007 after financial backing of the original project ran out. Now JonDo is 
maintained by members of the original project team and it provide free services as 
well as enhance commercial services. 
• Vidalia is a Tor client that bundle Tor software and Polipo and routes traffic 
across Tor network. Vidalia provides Tor users with options to donate their 
bandwidth as Tor relay, it constantly change user IP to disguise user Internet trail, 
and provide better anonymity. 
• PocketiX.NET is an academic, non-profit online environment for PocketiX VPN 
offered by SoftEther Corp. Unlike Hotspot Shield and other VPN clients, it is not 
based on OpenVPN, rather uses a proprietary system. All traffic over 
PocketiX.NET is encrypted using SSL, just like other VPN. Since it is run by 
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university of Tsukuba in Japan the actual speed user get depends on geographical 
location in relation to Japan. 
• JanusVM is a VMware based Tor/Privoxy/Squid/OpenVPN client that allows user 
to browse Internet without censorship. It combined the power of Tor, Privoxy, 
Squid, and openVPN to increase anonymity. JanusVM require VMware Player to 
work, it has advanced filtering capabilities for modifying web page content, 
managing cookies, controlling access, and removing ads, banners, pop-ups and 
other intolerable Internet junk. 
• ProxPN is a lightweight VPN client based on openVPN, currently have servers 
located in USA, thereby making speed varies pending on your location. To use 
the services, users are required to register first and traffics are tunneled through 
encrypted connection through VPN servers, then out of the Internet.  
• USAIP is VPN based on PPTP and L2TP protocols, though not bound to any 
operating System, Microsoft played major role in its development and it can be 
used on Mac OS and Linux as well. The program effectively tunnels all traffics 
through this service, thereby making all of your internet activities anonymous. 
• Your Freedom is java based tunneling solution. It has plain and simple looking 
java GUI with servers located worldwide, support UDP and allows you to play 
games online using the tunnel. 
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2.7.2. Window-based Solutions 
• xB Browser also known as XeroBank Browser, previously known as TorPark is a 
Firefox and Tor bundle it is often refers to as all-in-one solution, it has a vary 
speeds as it is the case with all Tor connections, however disabling images will 
speed up things. It is a window based solution. 
• Hotspot Shield, also known as AnchorFree is a free VPN based on openVPN. It 
encrypts all Internet activities of user and not just a browser as is the case for 
JonDo and Tor. It ideal for users requesting anonymity for other applications 
without the use of proxy. Because it doesn’t collect any identifiable data about 
user, it is the world must trusted VPN used by over 10 million people [23]. Users 
are rests assure that their privacy is guaranteed. Another good feature of 
AnchorFree is high speed comparable with commercial solution on the normal 
ground, but often display advert on a requested page when using browsers such as 
IE, Chrome, Safari and Opera, etc. But it is completely free. 
• AdvTor is developed with Tor advanced user in mind, a powerful alternative to 
Vidalia bundle. It allows pretty well customizing of Tor connection from 
adjusting bandwidth to manual entry / exit node selection. One of its best features 
is the ability to force a program such as instant messaging client to use Tor 
connection. Good to note that Tor is TCP based anonymity protocol which 
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doesn’t support UDP protocol. So any application that uses UDP protocol will be 
sent unencrypted over user’s network connection without the feel of Tor. 
• SecurityKiss is a simple window VPN based on openVPN, it has relatively fast 
speed depending on location. SecurityKiss persistently say they do not keep 
personally identifiable data about their users, but only log of user’s IP addresses, 
connection/disconnection times and traffic volume. They used the 128-bit 
blowfish algorithm to encrypt session data and use 1024-bit RSA certificates for 
session keys, so as to make user be rests assured that no eavesdropper can steal 
user’s data. 
• UltraSurf is a VPN program for Windows with server located in USA. The 
program collect user IP, the property of browser and / or your computer, the 
number of links you click within a site, state or country from which you accessed 
the site, date and time of your visit, name of user’s ISP, web page you linked to 
our site from, as well as page you viewed on the site. Some antivirus program 
false positively identifies UltraSurf as virus / Trojan since it can pierces through 
firewalls.        
• CyberGhost is a VPN client with server in Germany. They used 128-bit AES 
encryption on all connections to ensure a high level of anonymity and use special 
data compression techniques to make speeds faster. 
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• FreeGate is a free proxy offered by Dynamic Internet Technology Inc. The 
program offers unrestricted access for Chinese users, but restricted access to other 
users. 
 
2.7.3. Linux-based Solutions 
• Incognito Live System (Amnestic) is a Debian-based Live CD. Vidalia is bundled 
with the CD which forces all connection to go through Tor network. Absolutely 
no data is stored when using the Live CD unless explicitly configured to do so. 
• Estrella Roja (Red star) is a Linux based Live CD which comes with Tor and 
Privoxy. All data are route through Tor network, this distribution is in Spanish. 
• Privatix is by design almost identical to Incognito Live System, significant 
different is that Firefox with Tor button is the default browser. 
For the taxonomy of the above free anonymity software see appendix. Details 
information such as speed rating, anonymity rating, usage allowance, logging level, 
server location, supporting OS, Web of Trust (WOT) rating, and RAM usage are 
provided in the taxonomy.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SURVEY OF ATTACKS ON Tor 
 
Since its deployment in the late 2003 several efforts have been made to analyze the 
anonymity claim of Tor through different attacks on Tor protocol, some of which resulted 
in patching and updating of the program. Several attacks claim have been presented in the 
literature. The need to have a standard means of measuring the efficiency of such attack 
claims is highly needed.  
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3.1     TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 
Among the earliest attacks on Tor protocol was Traffic Analysis. The attackers 
demonstrate the possibility of obtaining information from Tor without even tempering 
with the core relays. This attack utilizes the tradeoff between the need for low latency and 
complete anonymity. 
 In [19] Murdoch and Danezis presented Low-cost traffic analysis that can be mounted on 
Tor by looking at a different behavior of Tor relays. Since in Tor cells from different 
streams can be sent out in round robin fashion which shows that higher load increases 
latency of all other connections. So by routing a connection through specific Tor nodes 
and measuring the latency of messages, an attacker can get estimate of the Traffic load on 
the Tor node and thereby possibly trace the path way. Moreover the possibility of linking 
transactions based on this attack was expressed, but the result of the experiment shows 
that they were only able to reveal the pathway. This work was done in 2004 when Tor 
relays were relatively fewer in numbers compared to the present number of Tor relays. 
We think it would be very difficult to realize the same result today, even without patching 
up Tor. 
In another work [20] Murdoch and Zieli´nski demonstrated how traffic analysis can be 
used on Internet exchange points by developing traffic analysis techniques which work 
44 
 
 
 
on sample data collected from Internet exchanges (IXies) and use Bayesian methods to 
obtain the best possible inference. This work revealed the vulnerability of Tor on a 
specific traffic while guaranteed safeness on others.  
Prateek et al in [24] presented a traffic analysis of low latency system through the use of 
throughput fingerprinting. The attack is based on observing throughput of a Tor circuit 
over multiple connections, and is able to say if two concurrent TCP connections belong 
to the same Tor user. The attack utilizes information leakage through circuit throughput. 
Using fingerprint the author determines whether two circuit share a common sub-path 
and finally analyzed their correlation using simple statistical test. The probabilistic 
observation was combined over multiple circuits, and leads to de-anonymize guard 
relays.  
 
3.2       ATTACKS ON Tor HIDDEN SERVICES 
Tor Hidden service was first deployed in 2004, it mainly aimed at providing protection to 
dissident and activists in a danger zones and was recommended by both Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and Reporters without borders.  
However in its earlier time Øverlier and Syverson [21] presented an attack on how to 
locate a hidden server by demonstrating how a single malicious node can reveal the 
hidden server, this attack utilizes packet counting, incoming/outgoing packets matching, 
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and etc. But the report seems to be presented at belated time after the introduction of 
guard node which protects Tor against such attack.  
In another work [22] Murdoch presented a possible attack that can reveal the Hidden 
server through their clock skew. The basic idea is to utilize temperature difference 
between the CPU of working nodes and that of idle nodes which has effect on clock 
skew, clock skew can be observed remotely by attacker to identify active and inactive 
nodes using timestamp and sequentially give clue about the likely region the hidden 
serves are located by exploiting time zone difference.  
A technique to prove that a confiscated hidden server has hosted a particular content was 
presented in [25]. The technique relies on leaving a timing channel fingerprint in the 
confiscated server’s log file. It is based on sending HTTP requests to the hidden machine 
and storing “date field” of the responses obtained. So to detect the fingerprint a logged 
entry is look for in a window around the time that appears in these responses. While, 
there are false positive results, the author provide analytical expression for the probability 
of detection and the false positive. One important issue that the paper did not address is 
how to reveal the Tor hidden server, as far as we know, no previous research on how to 
reveal the hidden machine has proved viable. Most prominent of the hidden server attacks 
was that of [21] which is not applicable to the present Tor network and that of [22] which 
only give idea on the region the hidden machine is located, but not revealing the machine. 
As we know the hidden server has no customary IP addresses, it mainly provide services 
as a local host through Tor network, which is very hard to detect.     
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3.3.  CELL-BASED ATTACKS ON Tor  
The unit of communication in Tor network is Cell. A Cell has a fixed width with length 
of 512 bytes, exactly the size of typical TCP packet. Because of the fact that different 
types of Tor cells are used to carry different type of information, researchers exploit 
vulnerability due to the nature of information they are designed to transmit.  
Ling et al in [26] presented a cell counting based attack on Tor. This attack was inspired 
by extensive experiment that reveals that the size of IP packets in the Tor network may 
not be fixed. The attack has potential of revealing anonymous communication 
relationship among clients, a malicious exit router randomly intercept a traffic from 
server to the client insert a unique signal that can change the cell counts and channel the 
cell to client along the circuit, however, malicious entry node detect the difference in the 
received cell and the enclosed signals. The core target of the malicious exit router is to 
intercept a CELL_RELAY_DATA which is the type of cell used in Tor network for 
transmitting data stream. Furthermore, the authors presented a situation where a 
malicious exit router only can be used to successfully lunch the attack based on sniffing 
the packets transmitted between client and entry node - but we feel this seems to be 
unlikely, because exit node is unaware of the entry node, so even if attacker wants to sniff 
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packet between entry node and client, he may ended up with a wrong packet since is hard 
to pinpoint the real “client – entry” peer of interest.  
Moreover, a New Replay Attack against Anonymous Communication Networks was 
presented in [27]. The replay attack is based on replication of Cell which is the unit of 
communication in Tor. The attack involves the use of malicious entry node which 
duplicates cells from the client and traverses both cells across the middle node to the exit 
node, present of duplicate cells at exit node result to recognition error due to disruption of 
normal counter. The attack is successful if attacker’s accomplice from the entry node 
controlling the exit node detect such decryption errors, thereby exposes the 
communication relationship between client and server. This attack was implemented on 
Tor and validated. Result of the experiment indicated the feasibility and effectiveness of 
the attack.   
 
3.4.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The research direction in Tor nowadays tilted towards enhancing the status quo through 
network performance analysis while maintaining complete privacy. In this direction, 
Murdoch and Watson [6] presented a metric for security and performance in low-latency 
anonymity systems and compared different path selection algorithms and analyze the 
algorithms using two metrics, vulnerability of being compromised with respect to 
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attackers resources claim and expected latency. Outcomes of the analysis indicated that 
Tor default path selection based on high bandwidth claims improve performance as well 
as anonymity compared to the supposedly more secure Tor uniform path selection 
algorithm.  
A case Study on Measuring Statistical Data in the Tor Anonymity Network was 
presented by Loesing et al [29]. In the paper the authors provided guidelines for safety 
measurement of Statistical data in the Tor Anonymity Network. However, the paper 
addresses two issues concerning measuring two types of sensitive data in the Tor network 
for performance evaluation; measuring client IP addresses and exiting port. The 
guidelines include: 
• Data Minimalism-minimizing the amount of statistical data required for solving a 
particular problem. 
• Source Aggregation-sensitive data should have a short time span, aggregation 
should be the source of data and always approximate exact event counts. 
• Transparency-public discussion of all algorithms for data gathering is essential 
before deployment and all measured statistical data should be publically available 
to avoid gathering of too sensitive data.  
[28] Presents a new method for path selection which allowed performance-improved 
onion routing. The authors believe that this new proposed method can be used to increase 
performance and security of the Tor network’s clients and equally serves as input for 
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improved designs of future anonymity protocols. The metric is based on actively 
measured round trip time and estimations of available link-wise capacities through 
passive observation of throughput.  
In [30] Norman et al proposed an algorithm that detects DoS in Tor network, using graph 
theorem to model the Tor network and mathematical theorem they were able to prove that 
the algorithm is capable of detecting DoS in Tor network. 
A new anti-misbehavior system for Tor network was proposed in [31]. After critically 
evaluating the existing Tor exit policies which the author claimed that it is insufficient to 
mitigate misused of Tor services. The new Anti-misbehavior system will contain two 
blacklists-global and local blacklists and three protocols-reporting misbehavior, building 
blacklists and blocking misbehavior user protocols.  Global blacklist is built according to 
every Tor relay local blacklist and maintained by trusted directory servers. On regular 
basis, every Tor node reports local blacklist to directory server and the directory server 
update the global blacklists and distribute the global blacklists to every Tor node. The 
authors provided a comparative evaluation of the new system by comparing the Tor exit 
policies against the proposed new anti-misbehavior system using three metrics - user 
experience, performance and anonymity. Though no experiment was carryout, one 
important issue regarding the applicability of the proposed system that was missing in the 
paper is the case of two important error measurements. We observed that the case of false 
negative in which a genuine user is blacklisted and a false positive in which wrong user is 
undetected was not giving account anywhere in the paper.  
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Optimal Path Length for Tor was studied in [34]. The authors investigate path length 
design decision and evaluate both two–hop and three–hop paths through experiment. The 
evaluation was based on two metrics. Security – by simulating Tor default path selection 
for two-hop and three-hop paths, result shown that two-hop paths are less vulnerable to 
circuit compromise compared to three-hop paths, but they are more vulnerable to 
adaptive surveillance. However, in terms of performance – the authors simulate real 
clients making http request for some popular websites and measure their downloads time, 
performance result shown that the download time for three-hop path is almost twice as 
the expected download time for two-hop path. Despite the outcomes of the evaluation the 
authors concluded that the argument is not strong enough to reduce the length of Tor path 
to two-hop.  
  
3.5.   ATTACKS ON TOR PATH SELECTION ALGORITHM 
Low resource routing attacks against Tor was presented by Bauer et al in [2], in their 
work they demonstrated how much extend is the routing selection optimization for 
performance exposed Tor protocol to end-to-end traffic analysis attack from non-global 
adversaries with minimum resources. Their approach involves compromising guard and 
exit nodes, by injecting few nodes with high bandwidth and high uptime claims, then 
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using their end-to-end traffic analysis method to associate the client’s request to its 
destination before any payload data is sent.        
Browser based attacks on Tor was presented by Abbott et’ al [24].The main idea is that 
the attacker can trick a user’s web browser into sending a peculiar signal over the Tor 
network  which subsequently can help identify the user’s identity using traffic analysis. In 
the paper they described how a malicious node acting as exit node, when selected by a 
client can insert a JavaScript code into unencrypted payload which is run on client 
machine and can generate identifiable signal pattern that can be detected by the server.    
Predicting Tor path compromise by exit port was presented by Bauer et al in [5], the core 
idea is to exploit the role of ports in compromising routing path based on the type of 
traffic being propagated. They achieved this by injecting exit nodes with different exit 
policy which makes client to select an exit node with high bandwidth and satisfy its exit 
port requirement. Through these they were able to analyze different applications. The 
research project we propose deviates from their work since our attack model goes beyond 
the passive attacker, here we considered a more active attack that tries to force the client 
redirect its traffic through unpopular ports.  
A practical Congestion Attack on Tor Using Long Path was investigated in [32], the 
attacker relies on using malicious exit router exiting HTTP traffic to inject JavaScript to 
the client which request user browser to perform http request every second and 
constructing a long circuit that include a particular relay repeatedly. This can be seen as 
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constraint of Tor path design which allows construction of circuit of arbitrarily length. 
Subsequently, using statistical evaluation of difference in latencies the attacker will 
determine with high probability the relays that make up the circuit.   
[33] presents a potential HTTP-based application level attack against Tor which takes 
advantage of Tor design feature and vulnerability of HTTP to man-in-the-middle-attacks. 
It employed a malicious exit router to act as man-in-the-middle-attacks to client’s 
communications. A respond usually a webpage to a request made by the client through 
malicious exit router can be modified or inject a new forged webpage which makes the 
client’s web browser to initiate malicious connections to get those hidden objects, 
subsequently, malicious entry router will detect such distinctive signal. Through traffic 
analysis an external attacker can be able to correlate the traffic between the client and the 
webserver.  
Manils et al in [35] presented attacks that target P2P protocol, particularly accessing 
BitTorrent with Tor. The attack explained how the identity of user can be reveal due to 
information leakage. The authors presented three techniques on how malicious exit router 
can de-anonymize BitTorrent traffic. Two of the techniques are completely passive attack 
that relies on information leakage of the application itself, while the third technique is an 
active attack that exploits the lack of authentication in the BitTorrent protocol.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED ATTACK BASED ON UNPOPULAR PORTS 
 
In this chapter we present a new attack scenario that focuses on Tor unpopular ports and 
combines inspirations from both Abbott et al [5] and Bauer et al [6].  Our work is similar 
to [6] in the sense that we investigate the relationship between the application layer 
protocol and the resources needed by the adversary to compromise path. The difference 
lies in the definition of attack scenario. Their attack scenario is passive. It involves 
injecting malicious entry and exit routers with high bandwidth claimed. Our attack 
however, is more active as it intends to reveal the identity of a Tor client connected to a 
compromised webserver. The attacker takes advantage of unpopular ports to play on the 
Tor path selection algorithm to select from few set of relays in which the attacker 
controlled a significant fraction. Our attack differs also from [5] since their attack is 
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browser based and tries to trick the user’s web browser to send peculiar signals over Tor 
network. Our attack on the other hand, involves pushing a Tor client to open a new 
connection through an unpopular port.  
 
4.1.ATTACK SCENARIO 
In this attack scenario (depicted in figure 4.1) we assume that a client uses Tor network to 
connect to a compromised server. This means that the server provides a certain web 
service and a visitor uses Tor to hide his real routing identity, so that you hardly know 
who visited the site and from where. However, the compromised server injected a 
program into a requested page that will force the client to open another communication 
through one of the Tor unpopular ports. This way the chances that the client will choose 
one of the adversary injected malicious exit nodes with high self-advertised bandwidth 
and exit policy that accept only the requested Tor unpopular port increases.   
The description of the attack is as follows: 
I. The attacker controls a compromised web server which has the ability to inject a 
program to any client visiting the site. 
II. The attacker injects some large number of malicious exit routers that accept a 
particular unpopular port, say port 1214, with high bandwidth claims. 
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III. The attacker injects some large number of malicious entry routers with high 
bandwidth claims. 
IV. A client connects to the compromised web server anonymously using Tor network. 
V. The server injects a hidden JavaScript into the requested web page by the client. 
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Compromised 
webserver 
5 
7 
6 
4 
3 
2 
12 
11 
10 
Malicious 
Exit node 
Script Server 
9 
8 
1 
Client 
Malicious 
Entry node 
FIGURE 4.1: Our Port Redirection Attack Model; first the Web Server is 
compromised by storing a Script. A client uses Tor via path (1-2-3-4) to make 
HTTP request; the response from compromised server contains an embedded 
stored Script (5-6-7-8). On the Client side the Script opens a new connection 
torrified through Tor network sending request (9-10-11-12) via unpopular port 
listen by Script Server.     
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VI. On reaching the client this hidden Script opens a new connection through Tor 
network sending repeated request through port 1214. 
VII. The attack is successful when the client passes traffic through both malicious entry 
and exit routers. 
To make this attack successful we need to answer some pending questions such as how 
could the attacker compromises the webserver? If the attacker succeeded in 
compromising the webserver and injects the script into the client machine how can the 
script forces the client to open a new connection through Tor network to a remote server 
using unpopular port?  
 
4.1.1. Method for Compromising a Webserver 
Here we considered two possible ways an attacker can compromise the webserver 
pending on the type of attacker in question. The internal attacker can simply find a way to 
modify a particular webpage in the webserver with appropriate authorization, so that a 
malicious script is stored. Another possibility involves external attacker to discover 
vulnerability due to poor programming practice and use cross-site scripting like (XSS-
like) technique to inject a script into the webpage. This script is then stores in the page 
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unknown to the server. Subsequently, each time a user visit the site the script runs in his 
machine. 
 
4.1.2. How to force a client to open a new connection through Tor  
Since the intention of this attack is to force a client browser to open a new connection to a 
remote server using an unpopular port. The attacker may decide to use a WebSocket 
technology which is a web technology that runs bi-directional communication channels 
over a TCP socket enough to tunnel Tor traffic [39]. This technology has been 
standardized by both IETF and RFC6455 [37]. One important feature of WebSocket 
protocol is the ability of its client side implementation to sense if user’s web browser is 
configured to use proxy to connect to a remote server and port and uses HTTP 
CONNECT to setup a persistent tunnel. This property of WebSocket protocol is essential 
to the core idea of our attack. WebSocket API has been standardized by W3C. Socket.IO 
(is a WebSocket API) provides a method that can push traffic from client to server in an 
efficient manner using simple syntax [38].  Apart from that, WebSocket technology is 
accessible to JavaScript in a newer version of web browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, etc.  
A simple client side JavaScript implemented to repeatedly send requests to a remote 
server listening to one of the unpopular ports, when embedded into HTTP response from 
the compromised webserver, will force the client onion proxy to open a new circuit. 
Because, it is unlikely that the Tor exit relay used by the client to connect to the 
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compromised webserver will relay traffics that warrants the use of any unpopular port. 
This way Tor path selection algorithm is left with an option of selecting from small set of 
exit relays that are ready to accept the unpopular port.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
               
  
// create a socket instance 
var socket = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:6969'); 
// Open the socket 
socket.onopen = function(event) { 
 // Send an initial message 
 socket.send('I am the client and I\'m listening!'); 
 // Listen for messages 
 socket.onmessage = function(event) { 
  console.log('Client received a message',event); 
 }; 
 // Listen for socket closes 
 socket.onclose = function(event) { 
  console.log('Client notified socket has closed',event); 
 }; 
 // To close the socket.... 
 //socket.close() 
 }; 
FIGURE 4.2: Client side WebSocket API Snippet  
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4.2.    Tor PATH SELECTION SIMULATION 
In order to investigate the relationship of Tor path selection algorithm and the amount of 
resources needed to make this attack successful, we developed a simulation that adhered 
to default Tor path selection specification as provided by the Tor Project. There are two 
parts of Tor path selection algorithm as elaborated in [2]. The Entrance Router Selection 
Algorithm which was incorporated into path selection algorithm with the introduction of 
Entry Guard, in which a client automatically chooses a set of onion routers flagged as 
‘fast’ and ‘stable’ by the trusted directory servers. And the second part of Tor path 
selection algorithm is the Non-Entrance Router Selection Algorithm used for selecting 
subsequent routers in the circuit. In this work we simulated the Non-entrance Path 
Selection Algorithm since it is optimized to favor router selection with high bandwidth 
and high uptime.  
 
4.2.1.  Non-Entrance Router Selection Algorithm 
This algorithm was optimized to favor router with high bandwidth for network 
performance reasons (see the Pseudo-code in figure 4.3). The algorithm has all known 
onion routers, router_list as an Input, and produces a randomly chosen router, weighted 
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toward the router advertising the highest bandwidth.  At the beginning the algorithm 
compute total bandwidth (B) for all the available routers in the router_list, subsequently 
choose pseudo random number C between 1 and   B. For each onion router from the list, 
a router is selected and its bandwidth is added to a variable T, if variable T is greater than 
C then the onion router is chosen for inclusion into the path provided the Tor path 
selection constraints are met. In the other hand, if T is less than C then more onion 
routers are selected and their bandwidth added to T until T is greater than C. From this 
we can infer that the more bandwidth an onion router self-advertised the greater the 
probability that the router is to be chosen, since the algorithm assign weight to onion 
router based on probability distribution that tilted towards the magnitude of router’s self-
advertised bandwidth.  
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Input: A list of all known onion routers, 0_ ←listrouter   
           Output: A pseudo-randomly chosen router, weighted toward the routers with highest 
self-advertising bandwidth 
0←B  
0←T  
0←C  
0←i  
0_ ←bandwidthrouter  
θ←listbandwidth _  
For each router  listrouterr _∈ do 
       )(____ rbandwidthadvertisedroutergetbandwidthrouter ←  
      bandwidthrouterBB _+←  
bandwidthrouterlistbandwidthlistbandwidth ___ ∪←  
end 
),1int(_ BrandomC ←  
While CT <  do 
       ][_ ilistbandwidthTT +←  
      1+← ii  
end 
return ][_ ilistrouter  
FIGURE 4.3: Non-Entrance Router Selection Algorithm 
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Details path selection specification can be seen in [4] however, router selection algorithm 
chooses router with the following constraints 
 
I. All routers in a path must be unique- no router is selected twice for the same path. 
II. All routers in a path are chosen from different family, no any router is of the same 
family with another router in the same path. 
III. By default, only one router is chosen from a given /16 subnet. 
IV. Routers chosen for a path must be all running and all valid, except otherwise 
configured by default. 
V.  The first router on the circuit must be flagged as entry guard by a directory server 
VI. The exit router selected must support connection to client’s chosen destination host 
and port.  
 
In all cases, the choices for entry and exit routers are based on considerably large 
bandwidth. Too much bandwidth above one-third of the total bandwidth of all routers in 
the network may lead to rejection of an onion router, while router with too low bandwidth 
may not be favored by router selection policy. 
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In developing the simulation we make the following assumptions: 
 
• The use of Entry Guard is disabled. 
• We assumed that all routers to be used in the simulation are valid and stable 
• We assumed that all routers to be used are from different family 
• All routers to be chosen are from different / 16 subnet  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this chapter we describe the experimental procedures we have adopted to show the 
workability of our proposed novel attack idea. The first part of this chapter presents our 
developed prototype implementation of the attack. It contains the implementation of 
compromised webpage and how to push a Tor client into opening a new connection 
through Tor network that require the use of a particular unpopular port. While the 
remaining part of this chapter discuss the simulation of Tor default path selection and 
how an attacker with significant fractions of malicious exit relays with exit policy that 
support this particular unpopular port could control large proportion of Tor traffics that 
need exit through the same particular unpopular port.   
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5.1. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ATTACK 
 
We developed the prototype implementation of the attack on a local machine using 
virtual box.  
• First we developed a simple webpage using php-mysql technology hosted locally 
on apache web server. The webpage provide user with news or article and 
requires users to drop a feedback in a text area. This article webpage was poorly 
developed which makes it vulnerable to injection of a JavaScript. 
• Apart from the webpage that provides article as described above, we also 
implemented a client and server sides, simple tcp application that is based on 
Websocket technology using socket.io. Socket.io is a websocket API. It is a 
node.js libarary which has ability to push traffic from client to a remote server 
through web browser proxy setting. So we installed both node.js and socket.io and 
later code a simple server side script that listen to port 6969. And client side script 
that recite on our apache web server directory.  We tested the connection between 
the client side script that resides in our apache web server installation and the 
server side script that resides in Socket.IO installation. Client side script initiates 
connection to the remote server through port 6969. 
67 
 
 
 
• We compromised the article webpage by injecting a client side script which was 
then stored in the webpage. To observe the effect of the attack we require that 
each time a user visits the webpage a new tab containing the client side script is 
open and connected to the remote server. 
• Finally, we visited the article webpage anonymously, using Tor browser bundle, 
and immediately a new tab opened by the side in the same Tor enabled web 
browser and established connection to the remote server which is listening to port 
6969. 
• This way we strongly believe that the Tor connection used to reach the article 
webpage (which passes through port 80) is likely to be different from the new 
open connection used to reach the remote server which listen to port 6969, since 
most exit relays exit policy do not support port 6969. 
 
5.2.   EVALUATING Tor PATH COMPROMISED DUE TO   MALICIOUS 
ROUTERS EXITING UNPOPULAR PORTS 
 
We obtained snapshot of the active onion routers from Tor’s directory servers consisting 
of 2858 routers as of 27th March, 2012. We preprocessed the data to obtain information 
such as each router’s name, status, version, self-advertised bandwidth and exit policy and 
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use these preprocessed data in our simulation, this is an indications of what client would 
experience while taking part in real Tor network. 
To test the behavior of the above Tor path selection algorithm to unpopular ports, we 
firstly simulate the collected routers for some unpopular application without injecting any 
passive malicious routers.  The applications are SMTP (25), NNTP (119), NNTP over 
SSL/TLS (563), Kazaa P2P (1214), Gnutella P2P (6346), Gnutella alternate (6347), 
eDonkey P2P (4661), BitTorrent (6881) and BitTorrent tracker (6969).  
However, to evaluate how vulnerable is path compromise to unpopular ports malicious 
routers in the range of 8 to 112 are injected into the  preprocessed dataset and used our 
developed path selection simulator to generates 1500 circuits for each of the above 
mention unpopular applications protocols (default ports numbers). Each malicious router 
consists of 10MB bandwidth, which is the maximum allowed bandwidth and advertises 
an exit policy that allows the client’s application to exit only.    
The same experiment was repeated with the different snapshot obtained from directory 
server on 14th April, 2012 consisting of 2998. However, in this case the numbers of 
circuits generated by path selection simulator are increased to 3000.  
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5.3.  RESULTS 
 
Since the focus of our work is the use of unpopular port to reveal the identity of client 
visiting a compromise server, the wide range of unpopular applications and their ports as 
listed above were simulated. By default these wide ranges of applications are rejected by 
Tor Network, partly because some of them leak information as they pass through the Tor 
network due to their unencrypting nature or when doing DNS lookup, and partly because 
some may carry viruses thereby exposing Tor relays to infection.   
However, since Tor is an open source anonymity protocol in which individual users 
donates bandwidth to relay traffic, it is completely the responsibility of relay donors to 
decide how they intended to make contribution to Tor network. Some relay donors may 
decide to accept such unpopular ports in their exit policies. In this study we run Tor 
browser bundle and generate the statistic of Tor servers exiting unpopular ports as of 
snapshot of 1st March, 2012 in table 5.1.  The table reveals how unpopular these ports are 
in Tor network, with NNTP over SSL (port 563) with highest number of servers (156 out 
of 2827 routers) ready to exit it, while the rest are insignificant; most of the amounts 
recorded are from small set of servers whose exit policy accept a range of port numbers 
that include most unpopular ports. 
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Port Number of Exit Nodes 
25 17 
119 31 
135-139 10 
445 10 
563 156 
1214 10 
4661-4666 13 
6346-6420 10 
6699 0 
6881-6999 0 
TABLE 5.1: Number of Tor Servers exit unpopular ports as of 1st March, 2012, at 
time interval between 9:00-12:00. 
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In another experiment we investigate the effects of injecting malicious exit routers to a 
normal Tor network by obtaining the counts for most frequently occurring router in total 
circuits generated for each application before adding malicious exit routers. And 
subsequently adding malicious exit routers in the ranges of 4 to 52 for the same 
application and recounts the number of times the same most frequently occurring router 
appears each time. Table 5.2 provides the relationship between a router that accept port 
25 as its exit policy with the bandwidth of 559 (which has the highest occurrence in the 
circuits generated without injecting malicious routers) and the number of injected 
malicious exit routers with bandwidth of 10240. Simulation result shows that the router 
with the bandwidth of 559 appears 84 percent in 1500 circuits generated without injecting 
malicious exit routers. However, with only four malicious exit routers the percentage of 
exit router with the bandwidth 559 reduced by 55 in 1500 circuits generated. This trend is 
observed in all the remaining unpopular ports under investigation. 
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No of 
Malicious exit 
routers 
% malicious exit 
(bandwidth=10240) 
%  exit router without 
malicious(bandwidth=559)  
 
 
0 0 84.26666667 
4 65.33333333 29.13333333 
8 81.86666667 15.13333333 
16 90.26666667 9.2 
32 95.33333333 4.133333333 
36 95.06666667 4.533333333 
40 95.8 4.066666667 
44 96.4 3.066666667 
48 97.06666667 2.933333333 
52 97.26666667 2.4 
56 96.4 3.333333333 
TABLE 5.2:  percentage exit router with the highest bandwidth before and after 
injecting malicious exit routers compared to the % malicious exit router in the 
circuits  
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Finally, the results of path compromise rate obtained by simulating each of the nine 
unpopular ports mentioned above are shown in figure5.1 to figure5.9.  
Path compromise rate indicates the percentage of the number of circuits in which 
malicious entry and malicious exit nodes appears, in other word the percentage of attack 
success in 1500 circuits generated for each port. It is observed from all figures below that 
there are fluctuations in the path compromise rate as the number of malicious router 
injected increases. This is due to random nature of router selection algorithm which 
sometimes may not favor router with higher bandwidth. However overall result shows 
that path compromise rate increases as the number of malicious routers injected increases 
in all unpopular ports.   
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Port 25 is officially used for email routing (SMTP) between mail servers. Figure 5.1 
indicate that path compromise rate of 20 percent is the maximum obtained as the no of 
malicious routers increases to 112.   
 
  
FIGURE 5.1: Path compromise rate for port 25 obtained from simulation of the 
default Tor path selection specification 
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Port 119 is officially used for retrieval of newsgroup messages (NNTP). The trend here 
indicates that path compromised rate increases as the number of malicious routers 
increases (see figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2: Path compromise rate for port 119 obtained from simulation of the 
default Tor path selection specification 
76 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 shown the path compromise rate for port 563. This port support NNTP over 
SSL/TLS (NNTPS). Despite that port 563 indicates that as the number of malicious 
routers increases the path compromise rate also increases, it records the least compromise 
rate among the ports under consideration – approximately 8 percent as the number of 
malicious is 112.  
Good to note that port 119 (see figure 5.2) which is the same protocol as port 563 (though 
unsecure) also records low compromise rate. The reason for these occurances could be 
explained by looking at the table 5.1 which shows that both ports have considerably large 
number of normal Tor routers that are willing to support such protocols in their exit 
policies. This implies that the chances of chosen malicious routers exiting such ports in 
Tor network will decrease significantly as indicated in both figures (5.2 and 5.3).             
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FIGURE 5.3: Path compromise rate for port 563 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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Port 1214 is officially used by Kazaa (a peer-to-peer file sharing application). Figure 5.4 
shown the path compromise rate increases steady as the number of malicious routers 
increases.   
  
FIGURE 5.4: Path compromise rate for port 1214 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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Port 4661 unofficially use by eDonky (a peer-to-peer application) has maximum path 
compromise rate of 20 percent as the number of malicious routers is 112 (see figure 5.5) 
and indicates increase in path compromise as the number of malicious routers increases. 
    
FIGURE 5.5: Path compromise rate for port 4661 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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Port 6346 is officially used by gnutella (also a peer-to-peer applications). Figure 5.6 
shown that the maximum path compromise is 18.6 percent at 104 malicious routers. 
FIGURE 5.6: Path compromise rate for port 6346 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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Port 6347 is officially use for gnutella alternate (a large peer-to-peer network) also for 
file sharing application. Maximum path compromise rate is 18 percent at 112 malicious 
routers (see figure 5.7)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  FIGURE 5.7: Path compromise rate for port 6347 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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Figure 5.8 presents path compromise rate for port 6881 which is unofficially among the 
port used by BitTorrent. The maximum path compromise rate is roughly 18 percent 
obtained at 112 malicious routers.     
FIGURE 5.8: Path compromise rate for port 6881 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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BitTorrent tracker unofficially uses port 6969 for end-to-end communication. Figure 5.9 
presents path compromise rate against number of malicious routers, there is a steady 
increase in the path compromise rate as the number of malicious routers increases.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.9: Path compromise rate for port 6969 obtained from simulation of 
the default Tor path selection specification 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ATTACK MITIGATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1.       ATTACK MITIGATION 
This type of attack is so strong that it is hard to be mitigated, since it involves injection of 
hidden script to a webpage unknown to both visitors and webserver (the host). However, 
certain number of precautions could be taken to mitigate the effect of the attack. 
The first precaution is from webserver point of view. In this case ensuring that all inputs 
to webpages are validated by imposing validation rule during development of the site will 
prevent any external attacker from compromising the webpage, since compromising the 
webpage involve injecting a script on a webpage due to poor programming practice. So, 
this way the identity of anonymous visitor will remain unknown. However, in the case of 
internal attacker who is within the system and has appropriate privilege to edit a webpage 
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in a website. This type of attacker is extremely difficult to be detected since adding a line 
of hidden script on webpage will remain hidden to visitor and the host. 
Regardless of the way a webserver is been compromised, anonymous client can mitigate 
against this attack by disabling all active objects (such as flash, JavaScript and active X) 
plugins on a web browser at least when using anonymity network like Tor. Most web 
browsers like Firefox provide users with option to disable any active contents from 
running when user visits a website that contains such embedded active objects. This way 
the chances of having hiding script to run on client machine is highly reduced. But this of 
course will come at a greater price, since most websites have useful active contents which 
when users disable all active plugins from running in their web browser this will affect 
user experience.      
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6.2.   CONCLUSION 
In this work we present a new attack idea which takes advantages of unpopular port to 
reveal anonymity of Tor clients visiting a compromised website. The attack involves 
forcing a client web browser to open a new connection that requires the use of an 
unpopular port in which the attacker’s controlled set of Tor routers support.  
We demonstrate the possibility of successfully implementing the attack by presenting 
different viable techniques, and we go further to present the prototype implementation of 
the attack. 
Through simulation of Tor default path selection algorithm we are able to present the 
effect of injecting malicious router with considerably higher self-advertised bandwidth 
into Tor network, as well shown the probability of end-to-end attack on Tor network. 
Maximum of 20 percent compromise rate was recorded for some application ports as the 
number of malicious routers increases to 112. However, overall simulation results 
indicated that compromise rate increases as the number of injected malicious routers 
increases.  
Finally, we provide different mitigation options against the attack.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 Taxonomy of Free Anonymity Software 
SN Name Platfor
m  
speed 
Rating 
Anonymity 
Rating 
Usage 
Allowance 
Logging 
Level  
Server 
location 
OS                                WOT 
Rating  
RAM 
usage 
1 JonDO cross-
platform 
Slow High unlimited Minimal worldwide Windows, 
Linux and 
Mac. 
Excellent 76 MB 
2 Vadalia cross-
platform 
generall
y slow 
medium - 
low 
unlimited varies worldwide Windows, 
Linux and 
Mac. 
Excellent 44.5-
52.5 
MB 
3 PocketiX.
NET 
cross-
platform 
medium High unlimited high Japan Windows 
and Linux 
Excellent 19MB 
4 JanusVM cross-
platform 
generall
y slow 
High unlimited varies worldwide Windows 
and Linux 
Excellent 53 MB 
5 ProxPN cross-
platform 
Fast High unlimited Minimal USA Windows 
and Mac  
Excellent 6.6 MB 
6 USAIP cross-
platform 
Fast High unlimited Minimal USA, UK, 
China, 
Netherland
, and 
Germany 
Windows, 
Linux and 
Mac. 
unknown  
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7 Your 
Freedom 
cross-
platform 
Slow High Low Minimal worldwide Windows, 
Linux and 
Mac. 
Excellent  
8 xB 
Browser 
Window
-based 
Slow medium - 
low 
unlimited varies worldwide Windows Excellent  
9 hotspot 
Shield 
Window
-based 
Fast High Medium 
up to 
5GB/Mont
h 
Minimal USA and 
UK 
Windows Good  
10 AdvTor Window
-based 
Slow Medium-
High 
unlimited varies worldwide Windows Excellent 8 MB 
11 SecurityK
iss 
Window
-based 
Fast High medium, 
300 MB 
/day 
Minimal USA, UK, 
Canada, 
Switzerlan
d, and 
Germany 
Windows unknown 5 MB 
12 UltraSurf Window
-based 
Fast High unlimited high Usa Windows Good 5 MB 
13 CyberGh
ost VPN 
Window
-based 
Fast High low 1 
Gb/month 
unknow
n 
Germany Windows Excellent 27 MB 
14 FreeGate Window
-based 
medium Medium unlimited unknow
n 
worldwide windows Excellent 15 MB 
15 Incognito 
Live 
System 
Linux-
based 
medium High unlimited varies worldwide Linux Good  
16 Estrela 
Roja 
Linux-
based 
Slow Medium-
High 
unlimited varies worldwide Linux unknown  
17 Privatix Linux-
based 
Slow Medium-
High 
unlimited varies worldwide Linux Excellent  
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APPENDIX B 
B.1 Experimental Results for 1500 circuits generated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80  980 8 4 984 0.27 65.60 65.33 
16 160 1228 116 97 1247 6.47 83.13 81.87 
32 320 1354 98 87 1365 5.80 91.00 90.27 
64 640 1430 214 204 1440 13.60 96.00 95.33 
72 720 1426 203 196 1433 13.07 95.53 95.07 
80 800 1437 205 196 1446 13.07 96.40 95.80 
88 880 1446 247 233 1460 15.53 97.33 96.40 
96 960 1456 261 257 1460 17.13 97.33 97.07 
104 1040 1459 299 295 1463 19.67 97.53 97.27 
112 1120 1446 310 301 1455 20.07 97.00 96.40 
Table 4: simulation Result for Port 25 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 65 8 8 65 0.53 4.33 4.33 
16 160 144 120 10 254 0.67 16.93 9.60 
32 320 265 114 23 356 1.53 23.73 17.67 
64 640 421 181 48 554 3.20 36.93 28.07 
72 720 489 209 57 641 3.80 42.73 32.60 
80 800 509 258 76 691 5.07 46.07 33.93 
88 880 573 234 92 715 6.13 47.67 38.20 
96 960 571 265 98 738 6.53 49.20 38.07 
104 1040 560 254 88 726 5.87 48.40 37.33 
112 1120 634 296 134 796 8.93 53.07 42.27 
Table 5: simulation Result for Port 119 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 72 38 1 109 0.07 7.27 4.80 
16 160 158 133 8 283 0.53 18.87 10.53 
32 320 251 106 20 337 1.33 22.47 16.73 
64 640 430 210 56 584 3.73 38.93 28.67 
72 720 453 232 66 619 4.40 41.27 30.20 
80 800 497 219 72 644 4.80 42.93 33.13 
88 880 535 238 92 681 6.13 45.40 35.67 
96 960 569 260 91 738 6.07 49.20 37.93 
104 1040 564 274 98 740 6.53 49.33 37.60 
112 1120 645 301 121 825 8.07 55.00 43.00 
Table 6: simulation Result for Port 563 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80  641 37 10 668 0.67 44.53 42.73 
16 160 939 126 75 990 5.00 66.00 62.60 
32 320 1171 114 92 1193 6.13 79.53 78.07 
64 640 1314 198 172 1340 11.47 89.33 87.60 
72 720 1328 214 187 1355 12.47 90.33 88.53 
80 800 1353 247 215 1385 14.33 92.33 90.20 
88 880 1341 267 237 1371 15.80 91.40 89.40 
96 960 1347 280 256 1371 17.07 91.40 89.80 
104 1040 1395 285 263 1417 17.53 94.47 93.00 
112 1120 1386 302 288 1400 19.20 93.33 92.40 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: simulation Result for Port 1214 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 639 34 13 660 0.87 44.00 42.60 
16 160 940 111 63 988 4.20 65.87 62.67 
32 320 1160 108 77 1191 5.13 79.40 77.33 
64 640 1289 202 177 1314 11.80 87.60 85.93 
72 720 1331 211 179 1363 11.93 90.87 88.73 
80 800 1362 244 225 1381 15.00 92.07 90.80 
88 880 1353 264 242 1375 16.13 91.67 90.20 
96 960 1357 242 215 1384 14.33 92.27 90.47 
104 1040 1385 262 243 1404 16.20 93.60 92.33 
112 1120 1378 326 300 1404 20.00 93.60 91.87 
Table 8: simulation Result for Port 4661 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 595 42 11 626 0.73 41.73 39.67 
16 160 944 115 76 983 5.07 65.53 62.93 
32 320 1136 109 80 1165 5.33 77.67 75.73 
64 640 1293 191 164 1320 10.93 88.00 86.20 
72 720 1320 230 204 1346 13.60 89.73 88.00 
80 800 1348 237 216 1369 14.40 91.27 89.87 
88 880 1344 260 228 1376 15.20 91.73 89.60 
96 960 1372 254 239 1387 15.93 92.47 91.47 
104 1040 1352 315 280 1387 18.67 92.47 90.13 
112 1120 1384 296 271 1409 18.07 93.93 92.27 
Table 9: simulation Result for Port 6346 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 631 30 8 653 0.53 43.53 42.07 
16 160 952 135 83 1004 5.53 66.93 63.47 
32 320 1135 95 71 1159 4.73 77.27 75.67 
64 640 1311 214 185 1340 12.33 89.33 87.40 
72 720 1327 196 171 1352 11.40 90.13 88.47 
80 800 1343 241 213 1371 14.20 91.40 89.53 
88 880 1347 266 240 1373 16.00 91.53 89.80 
96 960 1352 259 231 1380 15.40 92.00 90.13 
104 1040 1374 269 242 1401 16.13 93.40 91.60 
112 1120 1378 296 269 1405 17.93 93.67 91.87 
Table 10: simulation Result for Port 6347 with malicious  
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 431 39 10 460 0.67 30.67 28.73 
16 160 757 128 72 813 4.80 54.20 50.47 
32 320 975 79 53 1001 3.53 66.73 65.00 
64 640 1208 217 169 1256 11.27 83.73 80.53 
72 720 1217 198 160 1255 10.67 83.67 81.13 
80 800 1229 265 214 1280 14.27 85.33 81.93 
88 880 1277 238 201 1314 13.40 87.60 85.13 
96 960 1281 266 228 1319 15.20 87.93 85.40 
104 1040 1294 290 250 1334 16.67 88.93 86.27 
112 1120 1333 288 261 1360 17.40 90.67 88.87 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: simulation Result for Port 6881 with malicious  
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No of 
Malicious 
routers  
total 
bandwidth 
in MB 
no of 
malicious 
exit  
no of 
malicious 
entry 
no of 
match 
total 
malicious  
% 
match 
% of 
malicious 
% 
malicious 
exit 
8 80 414 45 11 448 0.73 29.87 27.60 
16 160 682 118 58 742 3.87 49.47 45.47 
32 320 892 108 76 924 5.07 61.60 59.47 
64 640 1127 206 157 1176 10.47 78.40 75.13 
72 720 1149 216 176 1189 11.73 79.27 76.60 
80 800 1171 243 190 1224 12.67 81.60 78.07 
88 880 1198 265 193 1270 12.87 84.67 79.87 
96 960 1219 263 214 1268 14.27 84.53 81.27 
104 1040 1231 290 224 1297 14.93 86.47 82.07 
112 1120 1237 289 233 1293 15.53 86.20 82.47 
 
Table 12: simulation Result for Port 6969 with malicious  
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APPENDIX C 
C.1      Figures generated in simulating path selection for 3000 circuits 
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